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Around the globe, governments have pledged to remove support for coal, oil, and gas,, noting that such 11 
fossil fuel subsidies “undermine efforts to deal with climate change” by keeping greenhouse gas 12 
emissions higher than they otherwise would be.1 Jewell et al. used results of integrated assessment 13 
models to infer that eliminating subsidies would yield “limited emissions reductions … except in energy-14 
exporting regions,” and described the emission reduction benefits as “small.”2 This characterization  is 15 
potentially misleading, and we use a simple, sector-specific model to show how the emission reductions 16 
from producer subsidy reform could be more material than Jewell et al. suggest.3 Fossil fuel producer 17 
subsidies delay a low-carbon transition in ways both material and political, and they deserve greater 18 
attention and transparency in global modeling analyses, as well as in policy-making.   19 
The study by Jewell et al. provides important findings related to fossil fuel subsidy removal. Using a 20 
synthesis of five Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), they find that subsidy removal could reduce 21 
global emissions by 0.5 to 2 gigatons (Gt) carbon dioxide (CO2) by 2030.2 Jewell et al. characterize these 22 
global emission reductions as “unexpectedly small,” while noting they would largely occur within a few 23 
energy-exporting countries and regions (Russia, the Middle East, and Latin America). 24 
We argue that the emissions reductions from subsidy removal are not small. By contrast, 0.5 to 2 Gt CO2 25 
amounts to roughly one quarter of the energy-related emission reductions pledged by all countries 26 
under the Paris Agreement (4 to 8 Gt CO2)  – all from a single policy approach that also comes with 27 
strong fiscal and other environmental benefits.4 This scale of emission reductions should not necessarily 28 
be surprising or unexpected: few policy analysts place their hopes on any single instrument to deliver 29 
reductions at the scale needed to meet climate goals. 30 
 31 
Moreover, we argue that the impact of subsidy removal on emissions is likely to be more significant than 32 
Jewell et al. find, particularly when considering support for fossil fuel producers in high-income 33 
countries. Although Jewell et al.’s approach uses common IAM techniques, it does not adequately 34 
capture investment dynamics in the supply of new fossil fuels, and therefore misses a major pathway for 35 
subsidy reform to affect CO2 emissions. Specifically, their approach does not consider how the timing of 36 
producer subsidies (concentrated early in an investment lifetime) and the higher effective discount rates 37 
of investors (as compared with society) affect investment decisions to bring on new supplies of oil.  38 
Oil provides more of the world’s energy than any other fuel, and exploration and development of 39 
supplies remain robust.5 Jewell et al. model producer subsidies to oil by distributing regional subsidy 40 
totals equally to all oil fields – new and already-producing fields alike -- in each region, proportionate to 41 
annual output. But that is not how subsidies to oil producers often work. Instead, governments often 42 
target subsidies more toward new capital investment than ongoing production. By lowering upfront 43 
cash flow requirements, government subsidies boost project investment metrics (such as rate of return 44 
or net present value), which leads producers to drill more new wells than they would otherwise. This 45 
locks in higher future fossil fuel production and, in turn, consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions.6  46 
Using the example of one type of subsidy for investment – accelerated depreciation of new capital 47 
investment – we illustrate how oil subsidies could have a bigger effect on global CO2 emissions than in 48 
Jewell et al.’s analysis. This particular form of support, exemplified by the “intangible drilling cost” (IDC) 49 
subsidy in the United States, allows companies to quickly write down capital investments that would 50 
otherwise depreciate more gradually, providing a boost to cash flow at the beginning of a project.  51 
The IDC subsidy is underappreciated in Jewell et al.’s analysis because they value it only at the reported 52 
value of about USD2016 0.20 per barrel.7 This reflects the reduction in cash flow to the US Treasury that 53 
results from the delay in annual tax payments. But while the US government may be almost indifferent 54 
whether they receive tax revenues this year versus the next, oil company investors are not – they can 55 
use that cash flow to accelerate new investment.  56 
If the IDC were valued not on a nominal cash basis but instead on a present value basis, using investor 57 
discount rates of 10 to 20%, the subsidy would make it substantially easier to invest in new oil fields, 58 
decreasing the breakeven oil price of new projects by USD2016 4 to USD2016 7 per barrel (Table 1).  59 
Changes in breakeven economics of this scale could have a substantial effect on global oil market price 60 
dynamics and consumption. This would especially be the case if subsidy removal were to render 61 
uneconomic many of the new projects on course to be developed before 2030. This outcome could well 62 
arise, since the US has a substantial fraction (more than 40%) of the new oil projects that can be 63 
produced by 2030 (Extended Data Figure 1). Other producers with substantial new supplies planned, 64 
such as Canada9 and Norway10, also offer accelerated depreciation of new oil capital investments. 65 
Table 1 estimates how the global oil market may respond to removal of the accelerated depreciation 66 
subsidies, based on a simple oil market model (see Methods). As shown, in the low oil price world 67 
featured by Jewell et al., the effect of removing the depreciation subsidy to producers could reduce 68 
global oil consumption by 440 to 770 million barrels in 2030.   69 
Yet Jewell et al.’s analysis includes only a very small fraction of this effect. They do not report this result, 70 
but we estimate it to be roughly 21 million barrels (Table 1, column A). 71 
We therefore believe that, in their low oil price case, Jewell et al. missed a reduction in global CO2 72 
emissions from oil combustion on the order of 200 to 300 million tons CO2  that could result from the 73 
removal of a single type of subsidy common in the US and other oil-producing countries. 74 
The actual outcome on net global CO2 emissions from all fuels is likely to be somewhat lower because 75 
coal or gas might substitute for some of the lost oil consumption, though concurrent removal of 76 
subsidies for these fuels would minimize this effect. IAM models, like those used by Jewell et al., are well 77 
suited to evaluating these interactions. Yet the scale on which CO2 emissions from oil have potentially 78 
been underestimated – equivalent to 10% to 60% of Jewell et al.’s reported global effect due to removal 79 
of all subsidies (0.5 to 2 Gt CO2 in 2030) – suggests that oil producer subsidies deserve greater attention 80 
and transparency in global modeling analyses.  81 
The investment-oriented approach to modeling subsidies used here and the broader, average cost-curve 82 
approach of Jewell et al. are not incompatible. Fossil fuel supply in IAMs could be modeled using an 83 
investment approach and vintage capital structure, as is commonly applied to power plants that have 84 
up-front costs and default lifetimes.8 In such an approach, new oil deposits would also be modeled as 85 
prospective investments, using realistic discount rates of 10% to 20% that are common in the oil 86 
industry and demonstrated here. 87 
In fact, subsidies may play an even more important role than we can quantify here. Extra company 88 
revenue resulting from subsidies can be used not only for more drilling, but also for product promotion, 89 
political activities, and other efforts that fortify the industry’s incumbent status. Subsidies also have a 90 
symbolic effect, in that they communicate the normative position that this industry and its activities are 91 
beneficial for society as a whole and, therefore, should be encouraged. Jewell et al. disregard these 92 
socio-political effects when downplaying the value of removing fossil fuel subsidies. 93 
The economic, political, and symbolic effects of subsidies reinforce each other.13 For example, subsidies 94 
can beget more subsidies, with new, long-lived fossil fuel infrastructure in turn (a) requiring further 95 
subsidization down the line to continue operating,14,15 and (b) yielding beneficiaries who will vigorously 96 
defend continued subsidization.16 Since there can be a revolving door between government staff and 97 
subsidy recipients, public officials may find it even harder to pass strong climate and energy policies.17 98 
Indeed, the most troubling impact and legacy of fossil fuel subsidies may be the political barriers that 99 
fossil fuel producers have erected in recent decades against decarbonisation efforts.18,19 100 
Rapid low-carbon transitions consistent with the guardrails of the Paris Agreement require dramatically 101 
reduced fossil fuel production.20 Subsidies to fossil fuel companies pose formidable financial, 102 
institutional, and political obstacles to this transition, impeding the efficacy of greenhouse gas emission 103 
reduction strategies. The apparent small dollar values of producer subsidies in official, government-104 
approved ledgers – and the limited emissions impact suggested by global models such as those used by 105 
Jewell et al. – can be misleading. The actual impacts, particularly when one takes into account their 106 
social and political impacts, are far greater.   107 
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Table legend 168 
Table 1: Subsidies allowing accelerated write-down of capital investment can reduce the breakeven price of new oil projects 169 
by USD 4 to USD 7 per barrel, depending on investor hurdle rate. These estimates are calculated on a present value basis, as 170 
the production-weighted averages across nearly 800 discovered oil fields in the United States (See Methods section). By 171 
contrast, Jewell et al. value the fast depreciation subsidy only on a cash basis, spread across all fields; while they do not report 172 
the value of this subsidy in their analysis, we estimate it from the same primary sources they used to be  about USD 0.20 per 173 
barrel (column A), as described further in the Methods section. We estimate the market effects of removing these subsidies 174 
using a simple oil market model, at three different investor discount rates (columns B-D), all of which are on a nominal basis (no 175 
deduction for inflation). We assume that not-yet-developed US oil projects are higher up the oil cost curve in 2030 (as is oil 176 
from other countries that also have a corresponding accelerated depreciation subsidy, like Canada or Norway), such that 177 
increases in the breakeven prices of these fields could well have a direct effect on long-term prices and consumption levels. We 178 
also assume here that subsidy removal begins immediately (i.e., in 2019), whereas Jewell et al. assume subsidy phase-out starts 179 
in 2020 and is completed in 2030. However, producer subsidy removal is not subject to the same concerns as consumer subsidy 180 
removal – namely equity and locked in consumer behavior – and thus would not need to be phased in so gradually.  181 
 182 
  183 
Methods 184 
Our analytical contribution is to show how different approaches to valuing fast depreciation subsidies 185 
for new oil fields may yield very different outcomes for global oil consumption and resulting CO2 186 
emissions from burning this oil.  There are three main steps to the analysis presented in Table 1. 187 
The first step, with results shown in the first row of Table 1, is to estimate how much two different 188 
subsidy valuation approaches affect the breakeven oil price needed for new oil supply investments to 189 
proceed. In one approach, adopted by Jewell et al. and confirmed by correspondence with Dr. Jewell in 190 
November 2018, oil production subsidies are valued by taking government- reported subsidy values 191 
(compiled by the OECD) and spreading them across all oil production in the given region. For the 192 
intangible drilling cost subsidy in the US – used here as the example of a fast depreciation subsidy – the 193 
reported value in 2013 and 2015 (years that Jewell et al. use to represent their high and low oil price 194 
cases, respectively) were USD 550 million and USD 660 million. Updating these values to USD2016 195 
dollars using the World Bank Development Indicators21 and normalizing for US oil production in 2013 196 
and 2015 years of 2.7 billion and 3.4 billion barrels22 yields about USD2016 0.20 per barrel in either price 197 
case. 198 
To value subsidies instead using the present value approach of investors, we start with field-level data 199 
on capital investment, operating costs, taxes, and production profiles for nearly 800 discovered but not 200 
yet developed (as of mid-2016) oil fields in the US.  These are the same fields analyzed by Erickson et al. 201 
2017, though we analyze them here anew, using the same cost and production assumptions as in that 202 
original analysis, including for tax rules. (We maintain such original assumptions unchanged, to 203 
accurately represent a point in time, recognizing that some factors may have since changed, including 204 
the corporate tax rate in the US.)  Starting with the field-level data, we then calculate how the intangible 205 
drilling cost subsidy would affect cash flows for each field and, in turn, the levelized net present value 206 
(NPV) for each project under three different investor discount (hurdle) rates: 10%, 15%, and 20%. We 207 
select these three hurdle rates (all of which are on a nominal basis, with no discounts for inflation) to 208 
represent hurdle rates common in the academic literature (10%) and investor literature (15%), as well a 209 
rate (20%) that represents a weakened, higher risk investor climate, just as Iyer et al. do for a different 210 
sector,23 and as is already being observed in some parts of the US oil industry.24 The results of this 211 
exercise are presented as averages (production-weighted across all 800 fields) in columns B-D of the first 212 
row of Table 1 213 
The second step in our analysis is to model the effect of removing subsidies on global oil price and 214 
consumption using a simple oil market model, parameterized by elasticities. Assuming, in the long run, 215 
that the oil market behaves as a single global market, basic microeconomics indicates that, for small 216 
increases in producer costs (here, resulting from subsidy removal), dτ, the resulting change in oil price, 217 
dP, can be approximated according to the following equation, where Es and Ed are elasticities of supply 218 
and demand, respectively.25 219 
݀ܲ ≈ ܧ௦ሺܧ௦ − ܧௗሻ ݀τ 
 220 
The choice of elasticities therefore determines the changes in price, e.g. presented in Table 1 of the 221 
main text.  222 
(1) 
Elasticities are not uniform; they depend on the oil price environment. For example, at very high oil 223 
prices, the oil supply curve is generally understood to be much steeper (fewer barrels of new oil supply 224 
available for each increment in oil price, i.e. low elasticity of supply) than at lower prices.  225 
We therefore adapt high and low oil price cases from Figure 1 of Jewell et al. to parameterize our simple 226 
oil market model (Equation 1 above). Specifically, we use their median values in 2030, denominated 227 
there in 2005 prices, and update them to 2016 prices following the World Bank’s World Development 228 
Indicators consumer price index.21 This process yields a high oil price case of USD2016 170 per barrel and a 229 
low oil price case of USD2016 70 per barrel. We focus mainly on this low oil price case in the text, much 230 
like Jewell et al. do, as USD2016 70 per barrel is much closer to the current price of oil and also to the 231 
long-term price of oil consistent with actions, such as may be taken under the Paris Agreement, to limit 232 
oil demand. 233 
To derive elasticities associated with these oil price cases, we look to an oil supply curve from Rystad 234 
Energy,26 widely used by the International Energy Agency and academic researchers, which shows large 235 
quantities of oil available at very low prices, especially from the Middle East where the supply curve is 236 
very “flat” (high elasticity), and steadily getting steeper at higher prices as new supplies become more 237 
costly. (A simplified version of this curve is included as Extended Data Figure 1.) At USD2016 70, we 238 
calculate an elasticity of supply of 0.6, and at USD2016 170, we calculate an elasticity of supply of 0.1. This 239 
range is in broad agreement with a review conducted by the OECD.27 240 
For elasticities of demand, we assume that under the high oil price case, elasticity of demand is -0.2, 241 
consistent with other studies, and noting high uncertainty.28–30 For the low oil price case, we assume a 242 
somewhat higher elasticity of demand, -0.3, under the assumption that it is lower-than-expected 243 
demand that could enable this low oil price case (e.g., due to faster-than-expected penetration of 244 
electric vehicles) and that the resulting greater consumer choice among fuels would result in a higher 245 
elasticity of demand, albeit one that is still conservative, as even higher values of -0.5 are common.30 246 
Elasticities of oil demand with respect to price of -0.2 to -0.3 are within the ranges for all five models 247 
reported in Supplementary Table 2 of Jewell et al., and are therefore considered here to be 248 
representative of the types of oil demand responses that those models would yield. 249 
Together, using the equation above, these assumed elasticities imply that in the high oil price case, each 250 
dollar of increase in producer cost per barrel translates into an increase in global crude price of 0.33 251 
dollars per barrel, whereas under the low oil price case, each dollar of increase in producer cost 252 
translates into an increase in the global crude price of 0.66 dollars per barrel. Applying these findings to 253 
the breakeven oil price effects from step 1, above, yields the increases in global oil prices reported in 254 
each column of Table 1.  255 
Further, estimating how these changes in price would lead to changes in global oil consumption is then 256 
straightforward, using the elasticity of demand, Ed, which is defined as the percent increase in demand 257 
as a function of the percent increase in price. Assuming that in the high oil price case, global oil 258 
consumption is 46 billion barrels per year, and under the low oil price case is 37 billion barrels per year 259 
(see Extended Data Figure 1, which shows these as approximately the oil production levels at USD2016 70 260 
and USD2016 170, respectively), a 0.33 dollar increase in oil price in the high oil price case translates via 261 
the elasticity of demand into a drop in global oil consumption of 18 million barrels per year, and a 0.66 262 
dollar increase in oil price in the low oil price case translates into a drop in global oil consumption of 110 263 
million barrels per year. 264 
Lastly, for the third and final step, we convert barrels of oil to CO2 emissions using the basic carbon 265 
content of a barrel of oil, about 0.4 t CO2 per barrel.29,31  266 
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Extended data legends 286 
Extended Data Figure 1. Cost curve of world oil production in 2030.  Figure shows cumulative supply of oil in 2030 at 287 
increasing oil price.  Most blocks (64) in this cost curve represent a combination of particular stage of development (four stages) 288 
in major world regions (eight: the continents plus Middle East and Russia minus Antarctica), whether onshore or offshore.   289 
Further blocks represent the United States and Canada, since they are major new sources of oil, about 41% and 7% of all not-290 
yet-producing oil in this figure.  Figure adapted from Erickson, P. Confronting carbon lock-in: Canada’s oil sands. (Stockholm 291 
Environment Institute, 2018) and based on data from Rystad Energy. 292 
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  (A)  
Subsidy 
valued on 
cash basis, 
as in US 
government 
source used 
by OECD 
and Jewell 
et al. 
Subsidy valued on present value 
basis, at range of investor  
discount rates  
(B) 
Rate 
common 
in 
academic 
literature 
(C) 
Rate 
common 
in 
industry 
studies 
(D) 
Higher-
risk rate 
(if 
weakened 
investor 
climate or 
higher-
risk 
fields)8 
  10% 15% 20% 
Effect of subsidy on economics of new oil projects     
Effect on projects’ breakeven price (USD2016), per barrel 0.20 4.20 5.80 7.30 
Market effects of subsidy removal, high oil price case, 2030     
Increase in global oil price (USD2016), per barrel 0.07 1.40 1.90 2.40 
Decrease in global oil consumption (million barrels) 4 76 110 130 
Decrease in global CO2 emissions from oil, million t CO2 1 30 42 52 
Market effects of subsidy removal, low oil price case, 2030     
Increase in global oil price (USD2016), per barrel 0.13 2.80 3.90 4.90 
Decrease in global oil consumption (million barrels) 21 440 620 770 
Decrease in global CO2 emissions from oil, million t CO2 8 180 250 310 
 

